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The American supremacy owes much to its geographical position. Being on the North American 
land mass, having to the North a big country – the second country on the earth by the surface – 
but with a population which is under 30 millions, and in the South a country which pays attention 
due  to  its  population  and  seashore  length  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  but  not  for  its  surface  or 
economic strength, USA has a certainty of the fact that none of them could start a military assault 
against it. Of course, there were exceptions, like that tried during WW1 by Zimmerman (then 
German Foreign Minister), through which Germany tried to win on his side and against USA the 
Mexican state, promising to help it; but this action didn’t have any success. 
But a much greater importance is the fact that USA has “good” neighbors on the West and East, 
because there it is “guarded” by two water extents, which act for its security as two buffer zones. 
USA has a great certainty that it would not be attacked by a land power (such as Mexico or 
Canada); furthermore, after it bought Alaska from Russia (March 1867) this certainty would be 
even higher. The only possibility to attack this country – if we don’t take into consideration the 
intermediate ballistic missiles or intercontinental ballistic missiles  – could come only from a 
great maritime power, and which could, through its long fleet’s arm, touch the American territory 
with its navy (this meaning that the ships could arrive close enough to American seashores) or 
with the airplanes which could take on from the navy. 
But this thing could be possible only if the USA didn’t possess a fleet which provided means for 
its security, and didn’t have possessions in the Pacific Ocean, from where it could supervise 
hostile  acts  which  could be  directed  against  it.  Hawaii,  Samoa, Johnston,  Palmyra,  Fanning, 
Jarvis,  Wake,  Guam,  Okinawa  are  but  a  few  points  from  where  USA  supervise  the  Pacific 
Ocean’s immensity. 
But we cannot forget the following thing: USA is “forced” to be a maritime power because only 
in this way it can proceed to sell its products and to be present every where on the Earth; in the 
same time, the length of its seashores to the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean – which are 
important factors regarding its maritime propensity – its natural resources – which permit it to 
build and maintain a great maritime fleet – and the acknowledge of the fact that it is better to 
prevent than to treat – which means that it is better to check all the seas which touch her territory 
than to protect only its seashores – impose this country to be a great maritime power. 
Furthermore,  taking  account  of  the  New  Orleans’s  importance,  where  there  is  the  mouth  of 
Mississippi river, and of the importance of this river’s basin for USA economy and security, the 
security of the Caribbean Sea and of the Gulf of Mexico, are of the greatest importance; of 
course, the security of Florida peninsula is of the greatest importance for Southern and Eastern 
parts of USA. The unshipping of a land army on this peninsula could generate great troubles for 
USA; and its shape impose that it could be better protected from the sea, not from the land. This 
is due to the fact that any peninsula could be better protected from the sea that from the land. 83 
 
The uncertainty of unshipping of a hostile army imposes that a peninsula should be protected 
from the sea; this kind of defense permits a quicker interception of the enemy’s fleet and hinders 
its desire to unship troops on the peninsula. The impossibility of precise identification means that 
in case a peninsula is protected only from the land, the defense troops could be dispersed, making 
much harder for them to defense in case of a massive attack. For this reason, a submarine fleet 
which have an eye upon the coasts (and upon the possessions from the high seas) are more 
important for its security than a strong land army. 
What was missing to America in order to exercise its power in the Caribbean Sea, in the two 
oceans  which  wet  its  coastlines,  and  why  not  on  the  entire  Earth,  was  its  incapacity  to 
concentrate its fleet. After USA took from Spaniards possessions in the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans, it pursued a canal building in Panama Isthmus. When this canal’s building was pursuing 
–  with  its  huge  importance  for  global  economy  –  the  geopolitical  factors  had  a  greater 
predominance for American leadership. Through its construction, the USA wins the advantages 
of insularity, which means its capacity to concentrate its navy.
33 This canal facilitates the quick 
concentration  of  the  navy.  Without  this  impressive  project  the  USA  would  have  played  an 
important role only on regional level, and wouldn’t have had the capacity to influence the affairs 
on the continents which border the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.  
After  the  transformation  of  Atlantic  Ocean  into  a  fortified  area  (through  the  application  of 
Monroe doctrine), the USA sustained that it could even commence a war, in order to maintain the 
inviolability of Western hemisphere.
34 In this way USA could expand its commerce and political 
influence, and could proceed to territorial annexation – it could become a great power without 
appealing to a policy of force.
35 Even from the beginning of their history USA followed up a 
policy  of  expansion  with  great  tenacity;  after  1794,  through  a  series  of  treaties  there  were 
established the borders with Canada and Florida, in America’s advantage. It was opened the 
Mississippi river for American trade and navigation; there was bought Louisiana from France 
(1803), a huge territory, together with the aspirations for Spanish territories such as Florida and 
Texas – bases for the future American sea power.
36 
In 1845 President James Polk explained that he pursued the Texas’ annexation in USA because it 
was necessary to avoid that this state to become an “ally with or dependent by a foreign nation 
much stronger than itself”, transforming in this way into a great menace to American security.
37  
The Louisiana’s selling was made by Napoleon the 1-st, because this territorial acquisition means 
with certainty the “rising of US power, and here we had already given to England a maritime 
rival, which sooner or later would beat its great proud.
38 
But an aspect with greater implications was another thing: there was manifesting a desire from a 
newcomer to enter the select club of most powerful nations on the Earth. And this took place in 
the second part of the 19-th century – when Great Britain, then being considered the greatest 
power on Earth, took the second place, after US. In 1875, US got an upper hand upon Great 
Britain in manufactures’ production,
39 and to the end of the century US energy consumption was 
greater than that of Germany, France, Austro-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy, taken together.
40 
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Once the US entered the phase of accelerate economic growth, its political power was felt more 
and more, and US perceived that it must proceed to translate this power into a more important 
position on international arena. Beginning with this period US started to build its commercial 
fleet and navy; and in 1889 Captain A. T. Mahan exposed a series of principles which promoted 
the development of military navy by US. 
As a matter of fact, President Theodore Roosevelt was the first president which insisted that US 
duty was to make felt its influence on global level and presented the American interests on 
international arena in terms of national interest. For this purpose, the US needed the creation of 
movement organs which could promote this position on global stage. And the development of 
maritime capabilities by this new power was of crucial importance. Roosevelt considered US as a 
power member in the great powers club, and in case that US interests collided with that of others, 
America had to mobilize its resources in order to impose its interests;
41 and for this reason this 
president was the one which gave to Monore’s doctrine the most interventionists’ interpretation, 
identifying it with the epoch’s imperialist doctrines. 
The optimism generated by the idea of “Evident Destiny” and the desire of some important 
personalities – the most notable being that of Roosevelt – looked for taking out USA from their 
isolationist  position.  William  Seward,  Secretary  of  State  during  Johnson  Administration 
considered that US had inevitably to exercise their commercial preeminence in “Pacific Ocean, in 
its inlands, and on continents which borders it.”
42 He wished American producers to conquer the 
Asian markets, and for attaining that, the US should first remove the foreign concurrence on the 
northern part of Pacific Ocean and to get the access in the most important ports in that region. He 
pursued the acquisition of Alaska Peninsula from Russia; his successors hadn’t renounced the 
idea of the expansionism policy, the Pacific Ocean being the most important interest area for 
American foreign trade. After the Civil War, US wanted to develop commercial settlements in 
this area, claiming more islands and coral atolls in central Pacific. Some of them were of the most 
strategic importance: the Samoa and Hawaiian islands. In 1898 Samoa signed a treaty with US 
through which there was provided a maritime base in Pago Pago. In 1879 Great Britain and 
Germany concluded similar treaties which were focalized on Samoa archipelagos.  
But  Hawaiian  islands  were  (and  are)  of  greater  importance  and  have  a  greater  strategic 
importance,  because  their  occupation  by  a  power  hostile  to  US  means  a  direct  menace  to 
American commercial interests (especially those regarding the trade with sugar), and a menace to 
American continent’s security, because US couldn’t check and defense itself from Pacific Ocean 
its Western coasts. And as a consequence of an unabated policy, in 1894 the Hawaiian Islands 
were annexed by USA. 
The expansionist spirit fully manifested in the decade 1890-1900, and a noisy group (which 
gathered more and more sympathizers) manifested the desire regarding the foreign territories’ 
conquering; the group had as leaders: Albert Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge, T. Roosevelt, and 
A. T. Mahan.
43 The tensions, and after that, the war between Americans and Spaniards in 1898, 
were  the  consequences  of  such  a  policy.  All  assay  –  which  were  successfully  touched  by 
Americans – had as central purpose the abolishment of other power’s access to the close space of 
US, especially in Caribbean Sea; these were indispensable premises regarding the exertion of US 
power in Panama Isthmus zone, area on which depended the possibility of American power’s 
expansion. 
Although the French started the workings at the Panama Canal, the Americans looked to identify 
ways which could permit them to exercise the control in the area where the canal was to be 
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fulfilled; they went even further: they followed the workings initiated by Universal Company of 
Inter Oceanic Canal regarding the connection of the two oceans in Panama area. 
The economic development of US and the looking for possibilities which could facilitate the 
external markets’ conquering had risen the importance of commercial fleet and of navigation. 
And as the commercial fleet’s protection could be provided only by a navy, there appeared the 
necessity for such a navy’s construction. “The necessity of a navy” told Mahan “is a direct 
resultant of a commercial fleet’s development, which is peacefully, and disappears in the same 
time with it, the only exception being that one where a nation manifests aggressive tendencies 
and keep its navy as a pat of its military corps.” 
And the same author sustained that when the maritime trade would get again its normal attention 
from American leadership, the interests linked to commercial navigation would sure bring the 
navy to life. He went even further and said that “it is possible that when there will be a certainty 
the possibility that a canal could cut the Panama Isthmus, the aggressive impulse would be strong 
enough to lead to the same result”
44 – those regarding the construction of a war fleet be US, as an 
element which could provide US with the means which could help it to influence the global 
affairs. Captain Mahan was to be a light for guidance for Roosevelt, as a prophet and teacher, in 
the same time, regarding the construction on an isthmian canal. 
Roosevelt regarded the canal’s construction in a very different way in comparison with important 
personalities  of  its  time;  if  for  some  leaders  there  was  a  welcome  thing  to  speak  about  the 
fulfilling of the Columbus dream, to name it a huge step in civilization area, or as Lesseps 
sustained, to bring a huge contribution in development of global trade, Roosevelt had a very 
different  vision:  for  him  the  canal’s  fulfilling,  first  and  last,  mean  not  a  vision  regarding 
commercial aims, nor the universal utility of the canal. For him it mean always the vital way, the 
indispensable way, to the global destiny for the United States.
45 
He had a special vision regarding its country’s destiny: he saw the US as a power which would 
command the two oceans, united through a constructed canal, being in the possession, being 
operated, supervised, and fortified by his own country. The canal would to be the first step taken 
for American supremacy on seas.
46 Doesn’t matter how big and important, or admirable would be 
other benefits as a result of canal’s construction, they worth only a secondary importance, for 
Roosevelt. 
Once the isthmian barrier would be put aside, the Caribbean Sea would become – as Mahan said 
– not only an area where the commercial currents would manifest with great intensity, but a vital 
military path. In that moment USA would need military bases in Caribbean Sea, which, “as a 
result of their natural advantages, susceptible to be protected, and being close to the strategic 
problem [the canal] would permit the navy to stay closer to the scene as any opponent.” With the 
Mississippi river entrance and exit provided – its basin being the permanent military operational 
base for USA – and with the Caribbean possessions in its hands, with the safe communications 
among these bases (the Mississippi base being included), with adequate military preparations, for 
which US disposed of all necessary means, their preponderance resulted “from their geographical 
position with a mathematical precision.” 
A member of Senate, Lodge, the closest Roosevelt’s friend, sustained even before 1900 that the 
canal’s  existence  made  the  Hawaiian  Island’s  possession  a  necessity,  while  Senator  Morgan 
sustained  that  even  Cuba  should  be  controlled  by  the  Americans,  taking  account  of  its 
geographical position regarding the Panama Isthmus. 
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After the American – Spanish War, the US became more active in Caribbean Sea area;
47 after the 
American victory over the Spaniards, then Secretary of State Hay entered negotiations with the 
British  ambassador, Julien  Pauncefote, in order to  obtain the  British’s  consent  regarding  the 
American  plan  for  a  canal  construction  in  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  Hay  and  the  British 
ambassador made quick steps, and as a result, USA got the right to construct and operate the 
canal. This treaty was signed on February 5, 1900. But the Senate would refuse the treaty’s 
specifications; the reason was this: if a canal would be open to all vessels, in time of peace or 
was,  doesn’t  matter  under  which  flag  they  navigate,  this  would  mean  that  it would  pose  an 
additional menace to US security; it would mean an additional duty, an additional geographical 
point where the American navy should watch. But if it is “fortified by us, it becomes one of the 
greatest source of American maritime power.”
48  
After President McKinley’s death, Roosevelt asked Hay to renegotiate his first treaty regarding 
Panama Canal. And there appeared the first treaty of Roosevelt’s administration. It provided the 
US the possibility to undertake all the necessary steps in order to protect the Canal “against the 
injustice and disorder”, this meaning in fact the possibility to fortify the Canal area. It was signed 
in  the  greatest  secrecy  in  the  morning  of  November  18-th,  1901,  while  President  Roosevelt 
declared himself “delighted.”
49 
This was to be the first important move of his mandate: and it regarded the construction and 
control upon Panama Canal. Even if the Canal didn’t existed, the US would have manifested a 
special preoccupation in relation to Caribbean Sea; and regarding the actions made in that region 
by any hostile power.  
And the US, through the help given to Panamanian secessionists during 1903, would obtain the 
greatest benefits: “We conquered the Panamanian area”, eulogized Roosevelt later. He conquered 
it, but by biting down the Latino-American pride. 
But this Canal would provide the rise of American power on global stage; digging it, the USA 
fulfilled the aim regarding the turning to account of its geographical position. It constitutes that 
element which is the base of American maritime power, because this canal watched by US is the 
path through which there could be made the juncture of American navies from Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans.  
It created for the United States the capacity to concentrate its military fleet. Creating for the US, 
through its realization, the advantage given by insularity, the Panama Canal and the American 
bases  situated  in  Pacific  Ocean,  gives  to  American  power  the  capacity  to  influence  in  an 
overwhelming way the Far East affairs, element which couldn’t pass unchecked by the fear and 
suspicion of the Siberian “Bear”.   
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Kissinger, Henry Alfred, Diploma ia, Bucure ti, Editura Bic All, 2002; 
2. Lott, David Newton, The Presidents Speak, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969; 
3. Mackinder, Halford, Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction , 
New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1942;  
4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660 – 1783, New York, 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1987; 
5. McCullough, David, The Path Between the Seas. The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-
1914, New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1977; 
                                                       
47 George Brown Tindall   i David E. Shi, op. cit., p. 622  
48 ibidem, p. 257  
49 ibidem, p. 259 
  87 
 
6. Paterson, Thomas G., Clifford, J. Garry, Hagan, Kenneth J., American Foreign Policy: A 
History. Lexington, Massachusets: D.C. Heath, 1977; 
7.Tindall,  George  Brown,   i  Shi,  David  E.,  America,  o  istorie  narativă,  Bucure ti,  Editura 
Enciclopedică, vol. II, 1996. 
   